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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5434
Stress tests are the main practical tools of 
macroprudential oversight. This paper reviews the stress-
testing practices of central banks in Central and South 
Eastern Europe (CSEECBs) and outlines the challenges 
in the area of stress testing going forward. The authors 
discuss good practice and the applied approaches by 
CSEECBs focusing on the main components of a typical 
macroprudential stress test, i.e. constructing the baseline 
and stress scenarios, mapping macroeconomic scenarios 
and microeconomic factors to risk factors, calculating 
risk exposures to different risk indicators, and estimating 
outcome indicators to inform macroprudential policy. 
This paper—a product of the Private & Financial Sectors Development Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region—
is part of a larger effort in the department to contribute to improvements in macroprudential supervision in the client 
countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be 
contacted at mmelecky@worldbank.org and anca.podpiera@gmail.com. 
The main challenges for the CSEECBs going forward 
involve needed improvements in data reliability, 
consideration of quantitative microprudential indicators 
in macroprudential stress tests, explicit incorporation of 
dynamics in stress tests to include reaction functions of 
banks and macroprudential policy, institutionalization of 
macroprudential policy responses to alarming stress-test 
results, use of the top-down and bottom-up stress test 
results in supervisory communication, cooperation of 
macroprudential and microprudential supervision, and 
information exchange for better cross-border supervision 
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1. Introduction 
Central Banks in Central and South Eastern Europe (CSEECBs) are mandated to foster 
financial stability in the financial systems of their respective countries. The Central 
Banks fulfill this mandate by conducting macroprudential policy including 
macroprudential oversight and implementation of macroprudential policy instruments. 
The main practical approaches of the macroprudential oversight are monitoring of 
financial stability indicators and conducting stress-testing exercises. Especially the latter 
should be forward looking and tailored to the specifics of a given financial system. Since 
the financial systems in Central and South Eastern Europe are often at rather early stages 
of development, compared to high-income countries, traditional banking business 
dominates the systems. As a result, the stress-testing exercises primarily involve banks 
and inform the macroprudential policy makers about the needed policy adjustments 
which are predominantly banking sector oriented. As in the case of monetary policy, it is 
important that the stress tests of banking systems are sufficiently forward-looking to take 
into account the transmission lags of macroprudential policy and the effectiveness of its 
instruments. 
 
This paper aims to review the stress-testing practices of central banks in Central and 
South Eastern Europe
1 and outline the challenges in the area of stress testing for the 
respective institutions going forward.
2 As the first of its kind, this review paper should 
help CSEECBs benchmark themselves against their peers in the region and compare their 
ongoing development efforts in the area of stress testing. Furthermore, this paper should 
also help the IFIs identify the most needed areas for technical assistance and prioritize on 
their development assistance in the area of stress testing across the region. In this respect 
we focus on components of a macroprudential stress test which typically involve 
constructing the baseline and stress macroeconomic scenarios, mapping the 
macroeconomic scenarios and other microeconomic factors to risk factors, calculating 
risk exposures to different risk factors, and estimating outcome indicators to inform 
macroprudential policy makers. We find that the main challenges for the CSEECBs 
underscore the need to address problems with data reliability, consideration of 
quantitative microprudential indicators in macroprudential stress tests, explicit 
incorporation of dynamics in stress test to include reaction functions of banks and 
macroprudential policy, institutionalization of macroprudential policy responses to 
alarming stress-test results and use of the top-down and bottom-up stress test results in 
supervisory communication, and cooperation of macroprudential and microprudential 
                                                 
1 The countries considered include: Albania, Austria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Greece, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak 
Republic, and Slovenia. 
2 The review is based on information shared by the participants of the seminars on “Advances in Stress 
Testing in Central and South Eastern Europe”, held in Prague and Thessaloniki in November 2009 and May 
2010 respectively. The presentations included: Colakovic (2010), Csajbok (2009, 2010), Dascalescu (2010), 
Gersl (2009), Guttierez (2010), Huljak (2010), Ivanovic (2010), Jurca and Klacso (2009), Klacso (2010), 
Manolov (2010), Melecky (2010), Puhr (2009), Seidner (2010), Sekulic (2010), and Woreta (2010). 
Addition information has been obtained from the financial stability reports of the respective central banks 
and individual follow-up surveys with the country representatives in the seminars.    3
supervision and information exchange for better cross-border supervision of international 
banking groups.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the general 
properties of stress tests and sets the structure for the rest of the paper. Section three then 
reviews the methods used by the CSEECBs to construct or generate macroeconomic 
scenarios in stress tests. Section four discusses the risk factors considered by CSEECBs 
and their modeling in the stress test. Section five then elaborates on the practices 
concerning the calculation of risk exposures. Section six reviews the outcome indicators 
of the stress tests and their usefulness for macroprudential policy adjustments. Section 
seven outlines the need and attempts to move from static to dynamic stress tests. Section 




Stress tests are practical tools meant to evaluate the resilience of individual financial 
institutions and of financial sectors to highly adverse but plausible events. They are used 
to quantify vulnerabilities, both from a microprudential perspective within the 
Supervisory Risk Assessments, where financial institutions are analyzed individually, and 
from a macroprudential perspective within Financial Stability Analyses, where the 
resilience of the entire financial sectors to adverse macroeconomic shocks is tested.  
 
Concerning the purpose of stress tests, one can talk about relative and absolute 
approaches based on the reliability and interpretation of the stress test results. An 
absolute interpretation hinges on the ability of the analyst to construct highly precise 
scenarios and to capture relevant risks including their interplay and integration into final 
outcome indicators. By definition the stress scenarios are outlier events or black swans 
that could be hardly predicted or for which model-consistent scenarios could not be easily 
constructed. Therefore, in practice, pure absolute treatment of stress tests is and should be 
avoided and rather relative interpretation of the stress-test results considered. This is 
despite the fact that on many occasions, the stress testers strive to and are asked to come 
up with concrete numbers, such as absolute amounts of a bank’s and banking sector’s 
undercapitalization. The relative purpose of the stress tests thus follows the logic of a 
peer-group analysis when banks are stressed by what is considered a reasonably strong 
stress scenario and then bank-specific results are compared to the average of their peer 
group. While absolute amounts, of e.g. undercapitalization, are also estimated, they are 
then related to the average undercapitalization of the peer group so that a problem bank is 
then asked to increase its capital to the peer group average as a sound practice rather than 
by an absolute amount.  
 
The macroprudential stress testing approach is traditionally a top-down procedure aiming 
to apply relevant and comprehensive stresses to each bank and consistently across banks. 
These stresses are thus not tailor-made for each bank but rather for a banking sector as a 
homogenous entity. It is therefore important that the top-down approach is complemented 
by a bottom-up approach using microprudential stress test where either banks themselves   4
or the microprudential supervisors construct specific stress scenarios for each individual 
bank based on their knowledge of the banks’ business specificities and corresponding 
bank specific risks. The results of the bottom-up stress tests should then be compared and 
discussed together with the top-down results and necessary adjustments to the top-down 
approach performed if bank-specific risks are way too important to be washed out at the 
macro level. A good cooperation among the macroprudential supervisors, 
microprudential supervisors and the banking sector is needed in this respect. Once it is 
established, stress-testing models could be an excellent communication tool between the 
supervisors and the banks in regards to implementation of macroprudential and 
microprudential policy measures and justification of their necessity. 
 
The move from single-shock stresses to stress scenarios, which occurred in the past, is 
analogous to the current efforts to move from the scenario effects on a single type of risk, 
such as credit, market and liquidity risk, to an integrated effect of the scenarios on all 
types of risks and their impact on the ultimate outcome indicators of interest, e.g. 
effective capital or liquidity buffers. A simple summation of the stress test results for 
individual risks using consistent macroeconomic scenarios hence does not account 
adequately for the interplay among the individual risks (credit, market, liquidity and 
operational risk). Similarly, a summation of the stress impacts across banks does not 
account enough for the possible contagion effects and the overall (synergetic) systemic 
impact.   
 
The financial stability divisions of CSEECBs have performed banking sector’s stress 
tests already for several years to assess the systemic vulnerability to certain risk factors.  
Bulgaria and the Czech Republic first tested the resilience of their banking sectors in a 
stress-testing framework in 2002, while Kosovo started only in 2008. The year when 
macroprudential stress tests were carried out for the first time is reported in Table 1 for 
each CSEECB. In many cases, IMF/World Bank’s Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP) missions were the starting point for stress-test implementation. Since 2008, 
through the Basel II capital adequacy framework, the importance of the stress-testing 
practice – both by banks and supervisory authorities – has been increasingly emphasized.    
 
Table 1: The initial year of stress testing.  
Country Year    Country  Year 
Albania 2004  Kosovo  2008 
Austria 2003  Macedonia,  FYR  2003 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  2005  Montenegro  2006 
Bulgaria 2002  Poland  2006 
Croatia 2004  Romania  2003 
Czech Republic  2002  Serbia  2007 
Hungary 2000  Slovak  Republic  2005 
Greece 2006  Slovenia  2005 
 
 
All CSEECBs rely on a top-down stress-test approach for the macroprudential analysis; 
some central banks complement their analysis with the results of a bottom-up stress-test.   5
In Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic
3, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Poland banks are 
provided with predefined macro scenarios and required to evaluate their impact on the 
credit, market, and liquidity risk indicators. In addition, Bulgarian banks are asked to 
define their “worst case scenario” and evaluate its impact. Either all banks or banks 
comprising the majority of the banking sector assets are considered in these exercises.   
 
There are countries (Hungary and Greece) that carry out a bottom-up stress test involving 
a survey of a limited number of banks mainly with the purpose of complementing their 
information and improving their estimates of certain parameters used in the top-down 
exercise. For instance, Hungary obtains estimation for default rates for unsecured 
household loans from a survey of eight banks.  
 
Meanwhile, a substantial effort was devoted to the development of stress-testing models 
to help supervisory authorities gauge the potential effect of severe but plausible 
macroeconomic downturns on banking sectors’ resilience. As of 2010, the stress-testing 
models for many CSEECBs moved from simple procedures of evaluating the effects of 
ad-hoc shocks, to scenario-based macro models. These models are meant to capture 
features of the banking sector (products and portfolio characteristics) and their reaction to 
various macroeconomic scenarios. For some CSEECBs, the models in use are the result 
of several years of research in model-building (as in the cases of Austria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Romania, and the Slovak Republic), while for other CSEECBs 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia) the stress-test macro models are yet in an 
incipient form. Nevertheless, all the participating CSEECBs reported that the scenario-
based stress-testing models are an ongoing work both in terms of refining the existing 
models to capture country- and sector-specific features and in terms of considering 
additional risk factors. The risks considered in the CSEECBs’ stress tests are credit risk, 
market risk, liquidity risk and contagion risk; however, most CSEECBs focus primarily 
on credit risk and market risk. Integrating concurrent effects of multiple risks remains a 
challenge ahead. Especially, integration of credit risk, including indirect credit risk from 
borrowers’ FX exposures, and liquidity risk for CSEE’s banking systems is crucial, as 
shown by the ramifications of the crisis. 
 
For many CSEECBs, the limited availability of data (both current and historical), the 
delays involved in accessing the financial data, and the inconsistencies among various 
data sources reduce the scope of stress-testing approaches. The CSEECBs that are 
confronted the most with the problem of data availability appear to be Montenegro, 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Kosovo.  
 
Generally, the implementation of a stress test involves the following steps: (1) 
constructing macroeconomic scenario(s), among which at least one contains extreme but 
plausible adverse events; (2) identifying and quantifying risk factors; (3) identifying and 
calculating risk exposures; (4) mapping macroeconomic variables to risk factors; and (5) 
mapping risks to outcome indicators (e.g., expected loss, capital adequacy ratio); in 
addition, dynamic stress-testing models would include (6) evaluating the reaction 
                                                 
3 The Czech National Bank introduced bottom-up stress testing exercise in 2009. The results are presented 
in the 2010 Financial Stability Report (see, CNB, 2010).    6
functions of banks and macroprudential policy to banking sector developments; (7)   
accounting for the feedback to the real economy and second-round effects. The general 
steps of a dynamic stress test are summarized in the flowchart of Figure 1. 
 




The frequency of stress testing in the CSEECBs varies from the quarterly basis (Albania, 
Austria, Bulgaria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, the Czech Republic, Macedonia, and 
Montenegro), semi-annual (Croatia, Hungary
4 , Kosovo, Romania, and the Slovak 
Republic), and annual (Poland, Slovenia). Typically, the aggregated results are presented 
in the annual Financial Stability Report (FSR) or Financial Sector Bulletin (FSB).
5 Table 
2 provides an overview of stress test dissemination through the FSRs among CSEECBs. 
The extent to which the methodology and results are presented in FSRs greatly varies 
among countries. The stress-test results regarding individual institutions are discussed in 






                                                 
4 Hungary plans to switch to quarterly implementation and reporting.  
5 The FSRs of the Austrian Central Bank and the Czech Central Bank, publish, apart from the results of 
regular stress tests, expert studies meant to develop the stress test methodology.   7
 
Table 2. Dissemination of stress-test methodology and results through FSR 
Country    Most Recent FSR that 
contains a stress test
*  
Analyzed Risks 
Albania  2008 FSR  Credit and market risks 
Austria  2009  FSR  Credit, market, liquidity, and 
contagion risks 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  2008 FSR  Credit, market, and liquidity risks 
Bulgaria  Does not publish FSR   
Croatia  2010 FSR  Credit and market risks 
Czech Republic
6  2010 FSR  Credit, market, and liquidity risks 
Greece  2009 FSR  Credit, market, and liquidity risks 
Hungary  2010 FSR  Credit and liquidity risks 
Kosovo   2008 FSB  Credit, market, and liquidity risks 
Macedonia, FYR  2008 FSR  Credit and market risks 
Montenegro  2006 FSR  Credit, market, and liquidity risks 
Poland 2009  FSR  Credit  risk 
Romania  2008 FSR  Credit, market and contagion  risks 
Serbia  FSR does not present stress test 
Slovak Republic  2009 FSR  Credit and market risks 
Slovenia 2007  FSR
7  Credit, market, and liquidity risks 
Note: 




A key component of a stress-test procedure is the generation of a set of macroeconomic 
scenarios to which the resilience of the financial sector is analyzed. The set of scenarios 
considered needs to contain a baseline scenario, which reflects the current economic 
situation, and some adverse scenario(s), which describes the effects of extreme but 
plausible adverse events on macroeconomic conditions. To the extent possible, the 
scenarios should reflect country-specific circumstances. If short data history or data 
availability are an issue, international experience should serve as guidance for 
constructing relevant stress scenarios (Buncic and Melecky, 2010).  
 
There are two distinctive approaches employed in the construction of scenarios: the 
judgmental approach and the model-consistent approach. The judgmental approach sets 
the relevant economic variables according to experts’ judgments. The model-consistent 
approach builds the macro scenario based on a model, which accounts for the 
interlinkages among macroeconomic variables, and eventually financial sectors’ variables. 
In practice, the macro scenarios used in stress-testing are often based on an intermediate 
combination of approaches utilizing both a macroeconomic model and expert judgments.  
                                                 
6 The Czech Central Bank, apart from the stress-test presentation in the annual FSR, publishes the quarterly 
aggregated stress-test results on the Czech National Bank’s web page.  
7 The results of the 2010 EU wide stress testing exercise are published on the Slovenian Central Bank’s 
web page.    8
 
As regards the baseline scenario, it needs to be consistent with the macroeconomic 
forecasts published by the respective central bank and used for monetary policy analysis. 
Elaborated country-specific forecasts are also available from the International Financial 
Institutions or could be based on market consensus. The setup of an adverse scenario is 
not a straightforward task.
8 Judgmental approaches proved to be too optimistic. Haldane 
(2009) refers to the propensity to underestimate the probability of adverse outcomes as 
“disaster myopia”. At the same time, macroeconomic models relying on through-the-
cycle, linear relationships have a limited ability to generate stress scenarios. Nevertheless, 
the cross-country evidence from the recent crisis raised sufficient warnings for the 
judgmental crisis scenarios not be overly optimistic in future stress tests. Regarding the 
shortcoming of typical model-based approaches, one avenue is to consider the adverse 99 
percentile of a one-year ahead dynamic forecast (Buncic and Melecky, 2010).  
 
Foglia (2009)
9, summarizing the credit risk stress-testing practices developed in selected 
central banks, finds that the adverse scenario is typically constructed using one of the 
following methodologies: (1) a structural econometric model; (2) a vector autoregressive 
model; or (3) a statistical approach. We add (4) a judgmental approach which is used in 
cases when statistical or econometric models are not capable of producing appropriate 
stress scenarios. This approach is also often employed by developing countries’ central 
banks due to the lack of historical data for estimation of macroeconomic models.   
 
A structural econometric model appears as the first choice for building a stress scenario 
for the central banks that use such models for forecasts and policy analysis. The benefits 
of using these models stems from the consistency among the predicted macroeconomic 
variables. Since most of the models used for monetary policy analysis are linear models, 
the typical concern relates to the observation of non-linear relationships among 
macroeconomic and financial variables during the periods of stress, including regime 
switches. Another concern, expressed in Foglia (2009) and addressed in Breuer et al. 
(2009), is associated with the difficulty to determine the likelihood of a macroeconomic 
scenario. 
 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models are used either because a structural model is not 
available or they are employed for their greater flexibility and easiness to generate a 
consistent set of predicted variables. Castren et al. (2008) demonstrate the advantages of 
using VAR models when the stress test analysis has a cross-country perspective. They 
utilize a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model based on 26 VARs, corresponding 
to 25 countries and one specific to the euro area, for credit risk analysis in the Euro Area. 
In this model the domestic and foreign variables interact simultaneously. 
 
                                                 
8 Breuer et al. (2009) claim that the current practice of stress testing has no systematic and transparent way 
to judge the plausibility of stress scenarios. 
9 The summary of other authorities’ approach to modeling the credit risk builds on Foglia (2009). She 
considers Bank of Canada, Bank of England, Bank of Italy, De Nederlandsche bank, Deutsche Bundesbank, 
ECB, French Banking Commission and Bank de France, Oesterrichische Nationalbank, Norges Bank, 
Sveringes Riksbank and Swiss National Bank.   9
A pure statistical methodology, based on the copula approach, brings in the benefits of 
working with marginal distributions instead of multivariate distributions and at the same 
time capturing the higher moments’ dependence among the macro-financial variables. 
Such dependence is an important feature to capture in order to adequately characterize 
the co-dependence among macro-financial variables in the times of stress, as the global 
financial crisis has shown. Although it can provide superior model forecast performance, 
this approach is criticized for its inability to offer a “story” and tractability for policy 
analysis.  
 
The use of judgmental models or expert judgment is often subject to criticism due to 
arguable structural (economic) inconsistency of the constructed scenarios. However, 
judgmental models allow analysts the possibility to consider more robust cross-country 
experience in constructing stress scenarios. In particular, the analysts could make use of 
the experience of countries that underwent financial crises and use some of the derived 
crisis shocks, in terms of changes in the macroeconomic variables, to construct stress 
scenarios for their own country.  
 
As regards the CSEECBs, many utilize the macroeconomic forecasts, provided by their 
Monetary Policy Divisions, for the baseline macroeconomic scenarios (Albania, Austria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, 
and Slovenia). In the case of Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia, the guidelines for the 
baseline scenario as well as for the adverse scenarios have been provided by the IMF. 
The Central Banks of Albania and Montenegro judgmentally combine the 
macroeconomic projections provided by their internal macroeconomic models with those 
provided by the IMF, both for the baseline and adverse scenarios. The Central Bank of 
Austria also makes use of the IMF forecasts for Austria and CSEE countries in which 
Austrian banks have important exposures. The Central Bank of Bulgaria constructs the 
baseline scenario based on the historical experience and expert judgment.  
 
The adverse scenarios are meant to reflect the country-specific macroeconomic risks and 
exposures. The Czech, Hungarian, Romanian, and Slovak Central Banks build the 
adverse scenarios using the same models as for macroeconomic forecast and the 
monetary policy analysis. For the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, the adverse 
scenarios for the first part of 2010 envisaged the risk of a more protracted W-shaped 
recession
10 (the ‘Double Dip’ scenario) and the combination of adverse financial market 
developments and weak economic growth relative to the baseline (the ‘Loss of 
Confidence’ scenario). For Hungary, the stress scenario is consistent with the EU-wide 
stress scenarios, and for the year of the financial crisis, it covered an external demand 
shock, a risk premium shock and a confidence shock. The adverse scenarios for Romania 
are built by mapping various country-specific adverse shocks (e.g., a sudden increase in 
the country risk premium due to political factors, a cease of the external financing 
agreements with the financial institutions, and a drop in external demand) in the semi-
structural model used also for forecasting purposes. The Polish Central Bank uses two 
VAR models to construct the adverse scenario. One model focuses on interconnections 
between financial market variables, while the other covers variables of the real economy. 
                                                 
10 In the Czech case this is partly associated with a temporary sharp appreciation of the exchange rate.    10
The variables connecting the two VARs are interest rates and the exchange rate. The 
Austrian Central Bank, in its Systemic Risk Monitor (SRM), employs for adverse 
scenario building a pure statistical methodology based on the copula approach. The 
Albanian, Croatian, Greek and Slovenian Central Banks use a judgmental approach, by 
expertly setting the macroeconomic variables’ deviations from the baseline scenarios. 
The Central Banks of Serbia and Bosnia & Herzegovina follow the IMF adverse 
scenarios guidelines which feature a negative GDP growth both for the EU and the 
country, and FX risk (Serbia) and an increase in the country risk premium (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). The Bulgarian Central Bank considers two different adverse scenarios 
based on judgmental assessment regarding the deterioration of loan portfolios quality. 
The Central Banks of Kosovo and Macedonia use mainly judgmental analysis
11 in their 
stress-testing assessments. Shocks related to developments in interest rates, exchange 
rates, the quality of loan portfolios and the extent of deposit withdrawals are expertly set.  
 
4. Risk Factors 
The second step of a stress-testing process comprises identification and quantification of 
risk factors. Financial sectors encounter several types of risks, namely the credit risk, the 
market risk, the liquidity risk, the contagion risk, the business risk
12, and the operational 
risk
13. Each central bank tends to identify and focus on country-specific risk factors. As 
the main and most complex risk attached to a banking sector, the credit risk is assessed 
by all CSEECBs. In addition, central banks in Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and the 
Slovak Republic examine the market risk, in particular the effect of exchange rate and 
interest rate changes on a bank’s financial condition. The liquidity risk is assessed by the 
central banks of the Czech Republic (the model-based approach), and of Albania, Austria, 
Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro (the judgmental analysis approach). The 
contagion risk analysis is performed by the central banks of Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Romania, and the Slovak Republic. We discuss the risk factors for the individual types of 




The credit risk is associated with the quality of loan portfolios. It is typically expressed in 
terms of loan performance, hence the main measures of the credit risk are: (1) the non-
performing loans (NPL, LLP and respective migration rates) and (2) probabilities of 
default (PDs) and loss-given-default (LGDs) and correlation of asset performance for 
individual credit portfolio components. Under the assumption that the loan quality is 
sensitive to the economic cycle (Foglia, 2009) these credit risk measures are estimated 
through the business cycle and cross-country benchmarks are available for instance from 
the QIS and Moody’s (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006; Moody’s, 2009). 
                                                 
11 The presentations often refer to judgmental analysis as “sensitivity analysis”. 
12 The business risk relates to the identification of risk factors that could affect banks market shares (for 
instance, product origination practices, pricing policy, and funding strategy).  
13 The operational risk relates to the increased probability of frauds in crisis times.   11
Depending on the availability of data, credit risk factors and their correlations with 
macrovariables can be estimated using  data on loan performance (historical NPLs, 
default rates, recovery rates, loan-loss provisions (LLPs) or cost of credit) or using micro-
data on corporate sector from credit registries and eventually household sector data 
(Cihak, 2007). The approaches relying on aggregate loan performance data are the most 
often employed, given the scarcity and delays associated with the micro-data from 
borrowers’ financial statements.  
 
Typically, the credit risk models include a measure of credit risk as dependent variable 
and macroeconomic variables (i.e., output measures, interest rates, inflation, and the 
exchange rate) as explanatory variables. When the estimations are carried out by 
conditioning on different sectors/industry specifics, sector- or industry-specific variables 
are considered. As for the methods of estimations, Foglia (2009) distinguishes among 
VARs for aggregate data, static and dynamic panel data for bank-level data, and logit and 
probit regressions to account for the non-linearity between macro variables and the 
default rates. We elaborate on estimation techniques applied by the CSEECBs in cases of 




One general approach well represented among CSEECB relies on estimation of the NPL 
regressions using either bank-specific data (Greece) or aggregated data (Croatia, Bosnia 
& Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia). Greek Central Bank’s credit risk assessment is 
focused on the estimation of the NPLs in a panel data framework. The NPLs are related 
to macroeconomic variables (GDP growth, the unemployment rate and the real lending 
rate)  and bank characteristics, such as performance ratios, total assets, the loans to 
deposits ratio, the solvency ratio, and the market power. This exercise is performed 
separately for corporate sector, mortgages and consumer loans.   
 
When micro data is scarce, estimations using aggregated data are employed. The Croatian 
Central Bank links the evolution of the NPL ratio to GDP growth and changes in the 
exchange rate. The Central Banks of Albania, Serbia and Bosnia & Herzegovina adopt 
elasticities attached to macro variables (the GDP, the exchange rate, the risk premium, 
and the interest rate) from the IMF guidelines to forecast the bank-level ratio of NPLs to 
total loans. The Central Bank of Montenegro supplements the bottom-up stress test 
survey by an estimation of the NPL ratio on aggregated data, where the explanatory 
variables are the real GDP, real net earnings, CPI, real PPES, albeit the relatively short 
time series are rather prohibitive for getting reliable estimates.  
 
The Central Banks of Poland and Slovenia use a substitute approach for estimating the 
NPL ratio, which involves estimating the loan loss provisions (LLPs).
14 The Central Bank 
                                                 
14 Foglia (2009) enumerates several works that use the LLP ratio to measure credit risk (among them 
Deutsche Bundesbank, 2006 and Swiss National Bank, 2006). At the same time, she point out the 
questionability of this measure given the fact that loan loss provisioning rules can vary across jurisdictions 
sometimes more than NPL (overdue loans) definition. In addition, the LLPs could be relatively more 
affected by the effort of banks to smooth income and dividend payouts to shareholders.     12
of Poland predicts bank-specific LLPs  in a panel framework by a model, in which the 
ratio of LLP to total loans is explained by macro-economic variables (changes in the real 
WIBOR 3M rate, the GDP growth rate, the changes in real wage fund) and banks’ 
characteristics (the composition of loan portfolio). The Slovenian Central Bank first 
estimates the evolution of different categories of loans (with the GDP as the main 




The Austrian Central Bank, in the framework of Austrian banks’ operations in the CSEE 
& CIS countries, includes in the stress test procedure estimations of NPL and LLP ratios 
based on a pooled data for CSEE & CIS countries, where the NPLs and LLPs are linked 




While the PDs are generally the output of model estimations, the practice for obtaining 
the LGDs so far (with the exception of the Czech Central Bank and Hungarian Central 
Bank) is a calibration based on expert judgment and Basel Committee’s prescriptions. 
The Slovak Central Bank uses the LGD ratio of 45 percent. The Bulgarian Central Bank 
calibrates its LGD estimates based on the bottom-up survey. Similarly, the Hungarian 
Central Bank uses LGDs for the corporate sector from the bottom-up survey of selected 
banks. For household mortgages, it estimates the LGDs using a panel regression 
containing as explanatory variables the loan-to-value ratio (LTV), the exchange rate, and 
house prices. Further, the LGD trajectories for the other sectors considered in the 
Hungarian Central Bank’s analysis are constructed under the assumption that their LGDs 
will increase in line with the LGDs for mortgages. CNB (2010) introduces LGD 
estimates for corporate loans, consumer credit loans and mortgage loans. Corporate LGD 
increases by 5 p.p. above the initial value of 45 percent for each percentage point of GDP 
decline vis-à-vis the baseline scenario. Similarly, consumer credit LGD increases by 5 
p.p. above the initial value of 55 percent for each percentage point increase in 
unemployment. For mortgage loans, each percentage point of decline in property prices is 
directly reflected in a percentage point increase in the mortgage LGD above the initial 
value of 20 percent.  
 
Owing to their importance in gauging credit risk, the estimations of PDs have attracted 
the largest modeling efforts so far. The PDs are typically modeled separately for various 
types of loan portfolios. The Austrian Central Bank focuses on ten different portfolios 
corresponding to ten industries. The Czech Central Bank estimates PDs for four different 
loan portfolios: non-financial corporations, loans to households for house purchase, 
consumer credit, and other loans. The Hungarian Central Bank also focuses on four loan 
portfolios: corporate, commercial real estate, household, and unsecured household loans. 
The Romanian and Slovak Central Banks model separately PDs for corporate loans and 
for household loans.  
                                                 
15 The Slovenian Central Bank also attempts to infer the evolution of  NPLs by using a model estimation 
for corporates' credit ratings.     13
 
The Austrian Central Bank’s SRM models historical default rates separately for ten 
industries. The equations include relevant macroeconomic variables and industry-specific 
explanatory variables.
16  The Czech Central Bank uses similar models for all loan 
portfolios considered. Namely, the dependent variable in these models is the twelve-
month default rate computed as the ratio of new bad loans over the initial loan portfolio, 
while the explanatory variables are: real GDP growth, real interest rates (one-month and 
one-year PRIBOR interbank rates), the real effective exchange rate, the nominal 
CZK/EUR and CZK/USD rates, and the level of indebtedness of the economy (the ratio 
of client loans to GDP). Hungarian, Romanian, and Slovak stress tests make use of 
different models for different loan portfolios, owing to the specificities of considered 
sectors and data availability. To estimate corporate PDs, the Hungarian Central Bank 
links the corporate bankruptcy rate to GDP growth, inflation, the nominal effective 
exchange rate, BUBOR, and EURIBOR in a VAR model. The Hungarian commercial 
real estate loans have been riskier than the average corporate loans, therefore their PDs 
are assumed to be twice as high as other corporate PDs. The Central Bank of Slovakia 
estimates the corporate default rates separately for three sectors distinguished according 
to their sensitivity to the credit cycle (sensitive, less-sensitive and non-sensitive sectors) 
using logit models. The explanatory variables in these models are the real GDP growth, 
inflation rate, 3M EURIBOR as endogenous variables, and the base ECB rate and 
Germany’s real GDP growth as exogenous variables. The Romanian Central Bank 
employs a more granular approach for the corporate loans using both micro-data for 
individual borrowers available from the Ministry of Finance and credit-by-credit data. 
First, financial performance of borrowers is predicted using scoring functions and a logit 
model linking corporate PDs with the macroeconomic variables. Further, it is assumed 
that the predicted negative change in a company’s financial performance signals a 
negative change in the expected performance of its debt; accordingly, the debt is then 
reclassified into a higher risk category. Based on this, LLPs are computed.  
 
Regarding the household PDs, the Hungarian Central Bank estimates a hazard model 
using a panel of banks, in which the macro explanatory variables are the unemployment 
rate, the exchange rate, 3M BUBOR, and EURIBOR. For the unsecured household loans, 
PDs are obtained from the bottom-up stress-testing exercise. The estimation of the Slovak 
household default rates are based on aggregated data. The explanatory variables in this 
model comprise GDP growth, inflation rate, interbank interest rates, and the 
unemployment rate. The Romanian Central Bank used to base the assessment of 
household credit risk on the assumption that the household sector’s LLPs had the same 
growth rate as the corporate LLPs, given the lack of data on disposable income and the 
level of indebtedness. However, the recent crisis proved this assumption to be obsolete; 
there is work in progress to link the household LLPs to macroeconomic variables (the 
                                                 
16 ANB (2009) presents an update of the ANB’s credit model. This introduces a principal component 
analysis in order to exploit the information in a larger macroeconomic data set (24 Austrian 
macroeconomic variables).  In additional, the issue of potential nonlinearity in the relation between credit 
and business cycles is tackled through a threshold approach. 
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lagged GDP growth and unemployment rate) and bank-specific variables in a panel 
regression.   
 
The Bulgarian and Croatian Central Banks also work on developing methodologies for 
gauging PDs. In the Bulgarian case, this combines model estimations, where PDs are 
linked to macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth, inflation, interest rates, and 
unemployment (for household PDs)
17 with information from a bottom-up stress test. The 





The market risk factors typically comprise changes in the exchange rate, the interest rate, 
security prices, and funding spreads. Interest rate and exchange rate changes ought to be 
considered, both as direct market risk factors and indirectly as explanatory variables in 
the credit risk models for evaluating NPL ratios, PDs, and LGDs.  
 
The direct effects of changes in interest rates and exchange rates are incorporated in the 
stress tests of Albania Austria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, the Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia. In addition, the Austrian, Czech and Slovak macro stress-test models work with 
the risk of a decline in equity prices. The Bulgarian Central Bank, in addition to requiring 
banks to report the effect of a predefined direct interest rate shock, gathers information 
about the market risk factors from the “worst scenarios” reported by banks in a survey. 
The Central Bank of Slovakia generates the market risk factors using a vector error-
correction model that estimates the pass-through of the key ECB interest rate into the 
interbank market rate, bank rates for loans and deposits, and interest rates of securities.  
 
Concerning interest rate risk, either changes in a single interest rate or a parallel shift in 
the yield curve are considered by the CSEECBs in the stress tests. However, recent work 
(see Villa et al, 2008) questions the relevance of the common approach to simulate 
changes in interest risk factors by a parallel shift in the yield curve. The Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (2001, 2006) guides banks to use a parallel shift in the yield 
curve by ±200 basis points or by the interest rate changes implied by 1
st and 99
th 
percentile of the distribution of historical changes in interest rate. However, a parallel 
shift in the yield curve tends to understate the actual impact on profitability during a 
macroeconomic distress because an adverse macro scenario usually implies flattening or 






                                                 
17 The estimation methodology has not been finalized yet.  
18  Since banks  earn their profits by maturity transformation (borrowing short and lending long), the 
declining slope of the yield curve further lowers banks’ net interest earnings.   15
The liquidity risk is judged by the number of days a financial institution would be able to 
withstand a liquidity drain without resorting to an external liquidity support. The liquidity 
risk factors then include estimated time-varying degree of liquidity for individual asset 
classes during crises together with historical estimates of plausible confidence shocks. 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) recognizes three broad liquidity risk 
factors: negative events, certain transactions & products, and market trends. First, 
negative events are any news that lead to a loss of market confidence in a bank or the 
banking system (such as bank rating downgrades, problems at parent bank, credit losses, 
or other reputation damage) and lead to a reduction in the access to unsecured borrowings 
(credit lines, deposits, and interbank funds), a higher required collateralization of 
borrowings, and a stop of funding through securitization.  Second, certain products and 
transactions, such as derivatives and other off-balance sheet instruments, can trigger 
liquidity drain in distress due to their contingent liability character. And last, market 
trends in over-reliance on more volatile sources of funding, such as wholesale funding 
and brokered certificates of deposits can trigger a liquidity drain. However, in practice, 
the shock that is most often considered in stress tests is the deposit withdrawal.  
 
Concerning CSEECBs, the liquidity risk is analyzed at the Czech Central Bank in a 
model framework
19 and at Central Banks of Albania, Austria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
Greece, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia using a judgmental 
approach. The Czech model accounts for two scenarios represented by a combination of 
idiosyncratic and market shocks (e.g. a bank run, drawdown of credit facilities, various 
degrees of uncollectibility of some short-term claims, and reduction in the value of 
securities). The Central Bank of Austria assumes various liquidity shocks as a decrease in 
the value of bond and equity portfolios, a withdrawal of interbank short-term funding, 
and a withdrawal of deposits; in addition, a scenario that combines disruptions in the 
money and credit markets is considered (ANB, 2008). The liquidity stress test at the 
Central Bank of Hungary accounts for a simultaneous occurrence of distress in the 
financial markets (default at HUF interbank assets and stand-by credit cancellation), a 
withdrawal of deposits, and an exchange rate shock. The values of the individual shocks 
are set judgmentally, based on historical data and recent crisis experience. The trigger in 
the liquidity stress tests at the Central Banks of Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Macedonia and Montenegro is the withdrawal of various types of deposits. In addition to 
deposit withdrawal, the Central Bank of Greece considers the inability to roll over 50 
percent of wholesale funding. Central Bank of Slovenia analyses the effects of a cessation 






                                                 
19 The model is an adaptation of the Dutch Central Bank’s model for the characteristics of the Czech 
economy; a key feature of this model is the link between individual banks’ liquidity and the market 
liquidity.   16
Contagion risk refers to the transmission mechanism of adverse financial shocks from 
banks’ individual exposures to the financial system as a whole. The severity and 
consequences of the recent financial crisis prompted the need to analyze the contagion 
risk as this is at the very core of the systemic risk (see Dijkman, 2010).
20   
 
The contagion risk factors can be distinguished between idiosyncratic and common 
shocks. An idiosyncratic shock is a shock that affects only one element in the system, 
such as an isolated case of a bank failure or a loss of confidence in a bank.  A common 
shock, for example a collapse of the exchange rate peg, affects more elements of the 
financial system. The initial shock can generate a second-round shock to (i) other 
institutions via direct cross-exposures and reactions of economic agents to the 
information and speculations about the shock and its effects; (ii) markets and financial 
infrastructure via contagion channels; and (iii) the economy via the loss of financial 
wealth and deteriorated access to credit, hereby producing contagion (Dijkman, 2010).  
 
The contagion risk is addressed by the Austrian, Czech, Romanian, and Slovak
21 Central 
Banks. The triggering shocks are typically idiosyncratic. The Austrian, Romanian and 
Slovak Central Banks consider bank failures as triggering events; the worst-case scenario 
in the Romanian test considers three credit institutions facing default simultaneously. The 
triggers in the Czech analysis of contagion risk are banks’ expected losses from the 
interbank exposure that are high enough to lead to a reduction in banks’ CAR. A bank’s 
CAR is then used to compute its PD for its interbank liability exposures. The occurrence 
of losses at one bank is thus transmitted to the other banks through the interbank 
exposures.    
 
5. Risk Exposures 
The measurement of a possible impact of the risk factors identified necessitates a careful 
consideration of banks’ risk exposures, which are the base for eventual losses. The 
consideration should focus on both on- and off- balance sheet items. Note that if some 
risk exposures are zero the respective risk factors become irrelevant for a given bank.  
This is essentially the mechanism how banks manage risks – i.e. by adjusting exposures, 
as in general they are not able to influence risk factors. 
 
5.1. Credit Risk Exposures 
The complexity of credit risk exposures can vary with the sophistication of the financial 
systems, albeit the general asset classes suggested in the Basel II Accord provide general 
starting point. It is important that the exposures-at-default (EADs), i.e. the extent of the 
credit portfolio which can go bad includes not only on-balance sheet items but also off-
balance sheets elements and qualitative properties such as concentration of the credit 
                                                 
20 Dijkman (2010) lays out a “Framework for Assessing Systemic Risk” meant to enhance the preparedness 
of authorities for systemic crises. This framework insists on the following activities: defining critical 
elements of the financial system; mapping interconnections (contagion matrix where matrix elements are 
institutions, markets and infrastructure); identifying information needs, and defining scaling criteria.  
21 The contagion risk is not assessed within all stress tests performed at the Slovak Central Bank.    17
portfolio, the single borrower exposure, the large borrowers’ exposure, unhedged 
borrowers’ FX exposures, etc. Overall, CSEECBs quantify EADs according to the 
general practice, namely as the volume of the non-defaulted portfolio.  
 
Additional indicators and/or models are used to analyze exposures to credit risk. The 
Slovak Central Bank constructs an indicator of credit risk exposure, “loans-at-risk”, 
represented by the share of loans to corporates that report losses and declines in 
revenues.
22  The “loans-at-risk” indicator is based on micro data from a sample of 
companies from the Corporate Credit Register and on financial statements from the 
Statistical Office.
23 The Czech Central Bank’s 2010 FSR (see CNB, 2010) describes an 
ad-hoc test of portfolio concentration. This test considers banks’ credit risk exposures 
related to the three largest debtors of each bank. Practically, for the period identified as 
the peak of the adverse phase of the credit cycle, losses from the assumed bankruptcy of 
the three largest debtors of each bank were added to the standard loan losses. However, 
the impact largely depends on the LGDs. The analysis considered two extreme LGDs, 45 
percent and 100 percent. The impact of such an ad-hoc test turned out to be dramatic if 
LGD was 100 percent. The Central Banks of Kosovo and Montenegro also report 
working with simulations concerning the effects of largest debtors’ defaults.  
 
While there are significant off-balance sheet exposures, such as preapproved credit card 
limits, overdrafts, and guarantees for direct cross-border loans in CSEE countries, none 
of the CSEECBs appears to account for these exposures in their stress tests.  
 
5.2. Market Risk Exposures 
The exposures to market risk are represented by those financial positions for which the 
changes in interest rates and exchange rates can generate losses. Interest rate risk changes 
affect the net interest income through the time-to-repricing gaps and time-to-maturity 
gaps. The value of financial instruments in the balance sheets is also affected by the 
interest rate adjustments. The exchange rate risk exposure of banks is probably the easiest 
to recognize and consists of net open positions in each foreign currency.   
 
The Albanian, Austrian, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatian, Czech, Greek, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Romanian, Slovak and Slovenian stress-testing models take into 
consideration the effect of a change in the interest rate on the net interest income and on 
the value of securities’ holding. The effect of changes in exchange rates on the net open 
foreign currency positions is also evaluated in Albania, Austria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Greece, Montenegro, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, and the Slovak Republic.  
 
5.3. Liquidity Risk Exposures 
The liquidity exposure is broadly defined as the obligations due during a specified 
number of days (usually exceeding 30 days) and is derived from liabilities and 
irrevocable, committed credit lines. The exposure related to liabilities is ideally 
calculated under the assumptions about rollover and replacement of maturing deposits 
                                                 
22 Similar underlying idea to the one the Romanian Central Bank uses to compute LLP.  
23 The shock associated with this in the stress test analysis is a 100 percent default rate for “loans-at-risk”.   18
and other borrowings, an increase in borrowings, and the maturity extensions of liabilities. 
The exposure related to committed credit lines is the sum of all upcoming loan 
settlements and prepayments.  
 
The liquidity exposures considered at the Central Banks of Albania, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro are represented by different 
types of deposits, in particular those of the largest depositors. In addition, the Central 
Bank of Greece considers the wholesale funding. The Slovenian Central Bank also 
focuses on the interbank short-term funding. The Central Bank of Austria includes among 
the liquidity exposures, in addition to the interbank short-term funding and deposits, the 
bond and equity portfolios (ANB, 2008). Assumptions about rollovers, increases in 
borrowings and maturity extensions are not considered so far by these central banks. The 
liquidity stress-test model at the Czech Central Bank accounts for the following 
exposures: deposits, credit lines, short-term claims on banks and other clients, 
government bonds and other securities, and assets for sale prior maturity. The model 
assumes no transfer of funds within the banking group and no issuance of new securities, 
a reduced liquidity of security holdings, a higher haircut on selected collateral accepted 
by the central bank, and unavailability of claims on credit institutions and other clients 
maturing within one month (CNB, 2010). The liquidity exposures considered in the 
analysis at the Central Bank of Hungary are the interbank assets, central bank eligible 
assets and exchange rate swaps and deposits and stand-by credits. The test assumes no 
active liquidity management from the bank side -- that is no rollovers of maturing 
interbank and foreign funds (HNB, 2010).  
 
5.4. Contagion Risk Exposures 
The exposure to contagion depends on the size of cross-exposures, interconnections 
through settlement systems, and a substitutability of tasks performed by affected 
institutions. First, the size of cross-exposures represents the amount of mutual holdings of 
securities and deposits & loans among banks in the system. Second, the frequency and 
amounts of transactions in the system determines the size of exposure in terms of 
interconnections. Third, the exposure to contagion is also judged according to the tasks 
certain banks perform in the system. Should an important bank be hit, some markets may 
become dysfunctional (Dijkman, 2010).   
 
The Austrian Central Bank bases the assessment of contagion risk (and implicitly of 
systemic risk) on a network model that accounts for banks’ net values of assets and 
liabilities and financial claims among the banks. This systemic model takes into 
consideration banks’ credit and market risk losses/gains as well as the interbank holdings. 
The final assessment is performed under the assumption that all interbank claims have to 
be set instantly. 
 
Contagion risk exposures are also considered in the stress tests of the Czech, Romanian, 
and Slovak Central Banks. The analyses are based on individual banks’ net interbank 
exposures. In the Czech stress test, the net interbank exposures represent the EADs on 
interbank market while the bank-specific CARs indicate the probability of default for 
each bank on the respective interbank exposure. The LGD is assumed to be 100%, given   19
that the interbank exposures are mainly unsecured. The expected losses due to the 
interbank exposure are thus calculated. The “domino effect”, that is a further re-
evaluation of CARs (and then consequently of interbank PDs) as a consequence of losses, 
is then assessed. The Romanian and Slovak Central Banks follow the effect of a bank 
failure on the interbank exposures of the other banks and assess whether this can 




The outcome indicators of stress tests should be useful for macroprudential policy 
decisions and point to required adjustments in the appropriate policy instruments. For this, 
the way how the outcome indicators arise, i.e. the tractability of macroprudential stress 
test, thus need to be clear to policy makers. The outcome indicators could relate to credit 
risk and market risks, such as undercapitalization, to liquidity risk and market risk, such 
as a liquidity gap, or contagion, such as knock-on undercapitalization or liquidity gaps of 
the banking system. Since the individual risks are analyzed separately, integrating the 
partial outcomes of stress-test components remains a challenge. Essentially, there are 
three approaches: (i) simple summation which ignores integrations between individual 
stress-test components, (ii) integration via copulas which is computationally intensive 
(Puhr, 2009; Seidner, 2010), and (iii) integration through surface integrals which appears 
to be less computationally intensive (AIS, 2010). Currently, the common practice 
amongst the CSEECBs is to either use approach (i) or look at several outcome indicators 
from different risk stress tests. We review the typical outcome indicators that CSEECBs 
use next.        
 
6.1. Expected Loss 
The final output of a stress test analysis is the impact measure of a macroeconomic 
adverse scenario on banks’ loan portfolio in terms of credit and market losses and the 
assessment whether banks can cope with them. Accordingly, the expected loss is 
computed and compared with banks’ buffer against adverse events. The expected loss is 
typically computed as the product of the PD, the LGD, and the EAD variables.   
 
Regarding banks’ buffers against expected losses, some stress-testing approaches are 
prudently considering only the regulatory capital including loan loss provisions, while 
others add to this the (expected) profit. Banks’ practical approaches show that the profit 
is indeed the first resort option before reducing the regulatory capital (Cihak, 2007). The 
general practice among CSEECBs is to count net earnings towards the buffer against 
possible losses.  
 
Recent work emphasizes the drawback of considering the point estimate of expected 
losses instead of accounting for the entire loss distribution.
24 Foglia (2009) reports that 
                                                 
24 The loss distribution describes the probabilities associated with various amounts of loan losses. The 
shape of the loss distribution is characterized by skewness and a fat right tail which signals that extreme   20
research projects meant to improve the stress testing along this line are under way at 
many authorities. Among the central banks that included a loss distribution into their 
stress testing is the Austrian Central Bank.
25 In the Austrian stress test, an overall system-
wide credit loss distribution is estimated by using a portfolio model, the Credit Risk Plus, 
which combines model-estimated sectoral default rates with individual borrowers’ default 
probabilities from the central credit register.
26   
 
An alternative approach to estimating the expected loss is the estimation of the LLPs; an 
increase in LLPs accordingly diminishes net earnings. The Croatian Central Bank 
assumes that the LLPs will have the same growth as NPLs, which are model-estimated. 
LLPs are also estimated by the Romanian Central Bank (bank-level LLPs) and the Polish 




Owing to the focus of the Basel Accords on capital adequacy, financial stability 
authorities express the outputs of their stress tests in terms of the number of banks with 
CAR under 8% (undercapitalized banks)
28  and accordingly the system-wide need for 
recapitalization. The capital adequacy ratio has in the numerator the expected loss 
subtracted from the buffer of capital and eventually profit, and in the denominator the 
risk-weighted assets (RWA). All CSEECBs express the output of the stress testing in 
terms of CAR and the need of recapitalization. After the estimation of the Expected Loss 
or LLP, some central banks use a combination of satellite models and expert judgments 
to estimate (net) earnings, and risk-weighted assets (RWA) – the remaining variables 
needed for CAR computation. 
 
The Hungarian Central Bank estimates the expected earnings using a model for the net 
interest income. Total earnings are assumed to change in the same way as the net interest 
income (NII), because the total earnings themselves are seen as containing “too much 
noise” for modeling. The model used by the Hungarian Central Bank to forecast NII 
relates the NII to the loan stock, the industrial production, the CPI, the exchange rate, the 
short term interest rate and the steepness of the yield curve in a VAR framework. The 
Czech Central Bank’ 2010 FSR introduces a new income model, which estimates the 
adjusted operating profit (AOP).
29  This model relates the growth in the AOP to the 
change in the slope of the yield curve, growth in the volume of NPLs, average nominal 
GDP growth for the last six quarters and the lagged CAR. The Slovak Central Bank 
computes total NII as the sum of the NII from the portfolio of loans and deposits and the 
NII from the portfolio of securities. The expected NII from loans and deposits is based on 
                                                                                                                                                 
losses are associated with a non-zero probability. The frequency of larger losses increases during an 
economic downturn, which increases the tail of the loss distribution. 
25 Sveriges Riksbank also considers a credit loss distribution (Foglia, 2009). 
26 See Foglia (2009), for a description of other approaches and research projects meant to incorporate a loss 
distribution instead of a point estimate of the loss. 
27 See section 4.1. 
28 The general 8% minimum CAR could substituted by a respective country-specific minimum CAR, and 
CSEECBs often use 10% or 12% as the minimum CAR. 
29 The AOP is constructed as the sum of NII, profit from fees and commissions, and dividends received less 
administrative and other operating expenses.    21
the predicted developments for loan and deposit interest rates and predicted volumes for 
loans and deposits.
30  The NII from the securities portfolio is estimated under the 
assumption that the portfolio of securities will be constant during the stress period, while 
the future values of zero-coupon swap rates are estimated using error-correction 
equations. The Polish Central Bank computes the “stressed” CAR under the assumptions 
of a constant level and composition of banks’ assets and a decrease in the net operating 
income before provisions by 10%. Regarding the RWA, a typical assumption among 
CSEECBs is that the RWA changes in line with the total portfolio, and that it is adjusted 
for exchange rate changes and loan losses. The Central Bank of Austria estimates the 
increases in RWA based on an IRB-bank model used by the off-site supervisory unit. 
Hence, with the exception of the Central Bank of Austria, none of the CSEECBs uses the 
Basel II capital charge equation or other loss distribution-based method to compute 
unexpected losses and the associated RWA or the change in RWA due to stresses.  
 
6.3 Liquidity Risk Indicators 
The liquidity stress tests involve a measure of the net funding requirement, the liquidity 
gap, and an identification of assets that could be sold in order to finance the liquidity gap. 
The excess of the stressed liquidity exposure over the available liquid assets defines the 
liquidity gap. Depending on the particular scenario (the combination of risk factors), the 
gap is addressed by considering assets that could be liquidated quickly and with minimal 
haircuts and identifying other sources of additional funds. Banks with a sufficiently large 
portfolio of high quality (government) securities are more likely to withstand liquidity 
shocks.  
 
The ratio of loans to deposits is often used as a liquidity risk indicator, owing to the 
presumed maturity mismatch between funding and lending. However, the funding 
structure varies across banks and thus this indicator cannot be employed universally. 
There are banks with a high ratio of loans to deposits and still have a relatively good 
liquidity position. 
 
Among the CSEECBs, the Central Banks of Albania, Austria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia estimate and report liquidity risk indicators. 
Albania and Bosnia & Herzegovina estimate the number of days the banking system can 
withstand a presumed liquidity drain. The Hungarian Central Bank reports a 30-day 
liquidity gap
31  for seven major banks. The Austrian Central Bank focuses on three 
liquidity ratios – liquid assets over short-term liabilities.
32 The Slovenian Central Bank 
also computes several liquidity indicators (deposits with the Central Bank over loans to 
                                                 
30 The loan and deposit rates are predicted based on an error-correction model that captures the pass-
through from the money market rates to loan and deposit rates. The volumes of loans and deposits are 
modeled by simple autoregressive processes.  
31 HNB (2010) refers to the liquidity gap as the “treasury gap”.  
32 The denominators (short-term liabilities) were identical in all three ratios. In the first ratio, the numerator 
was defined as cash, deposits at central banks, debt instruments, listed bonds and listed equities. In the 
second ratio, the numerator considered, in addition to the items in the first ratio, overnight loans to banks 
and non-banks minus overdrafts. In the third ratio, the numerator additionally accounts for 50 percent of 
non-blank loans and 100 percent of interbank loans with residual maturities between two days and three 
months (OeNB, 2008).   22
the Central Bank, issued securities over loans to the Central Bank, investment in debt 
securities over total assets, cash and claims against banks over liabilities to banks). The 
Czech Central Bank reports the computation of bank-specific liquidity gaps for two 
predefined scenarios. This computation accounts for the responses of banks in the form of 
sales of liquid securities to mitigate the impact of the initial shock on the balance-sheet 
liquidity of individual banks. The model also considers the increase in the reputational 
risk of each responding bank and the systemic risk (see CNB, 2010).  
 
6.4 Contagion Risk Indicators 
There are three types of indicators for contagion risk corresponding to the financial 
institutions and infrastructure, markets, and the real economy. The risk indicators in 
financial institutions and infrastructure focus primarily on liquidity shortage (the size of 
unsettled payments and transactions, deposit withdrawals & frozen credit lines, and 
interbank market & CDS spreads and volumes of trade), the amount of losses (write-
downs and market valuation losses), and the expected profitability of financial sector. 
Distress in markets can be observed on market volatility index and turnovers. In the real 
economy, the indicators include the amount of uninsured deposits, direct and indirect 
losses on financial assets, credit standards, and business and consumer confidence 
indicators.   
 
Among CSEECBs, the Austrian and Czech Central Banks estimate the total losses for the 
situation that a bank’s relatively high losses (or failure) trigger the “domino effect” of 




The prevalent stress test methodology in use by most central banks and financial 
institutions is static, namely the effect of an adverse scenario is directly mapped into the 
banks’ financial statements and accordingly the number of undercapitalized banks and 
needs for re-capitalization are derived. However, this methodology does not account for 
several important facts: (1) some risk factors (as the direct effect of the interest rate risk 
or the exchange rate risk) propagate at much higher pace than other risk factors, as the 
credit risk ones; (2) the existence of second round effects, as the banks and the 
macroprudential policy react to the adverse event – banks adjust the lending and deposit 
rates and credit standards while the macroprudential supervision might adjust reserve and 
liquidity requirements, risk-weights and provisioning requirements; (3) following this 
reactions, there would be significant feedback effects onto the real economy (impact on 
credit growth, GDP growth, inflation, the exchange rate, and the risk premium). The 
latter will then impact on financial conditions of banks in a dynamic stress test.  
 
The problematic fact that not all parts of financial statements react at the same time is 
seemingly overcome by setting a relatively long time horizon (a year or two) for the 
analysis. The Czech Central Bank attempts to capture the dynamics by replacing yearly 
with quarterly computations. Predictions of banks’ balance sheets and income statements 
are computed dynamically, with each quarter’s initial values based on the previous   23
quarter’s predictions. The Croatian Central Bank also reports a stronger reliance on 
quarterly projection in the 2010 stress test exercise (CrNB, 2010). The models of all other 
CSEECBs are static so far, and none of the CSEECBs considers reaction functions of the 
banking sector and the macroprudential policy, and the implied second-round effects on 
the real economy in their stress tests. 
 
There is a clear need to account for all the shortcomings stemming from the static 
character of the prevalent stress tests.  Haldane (2009) emphasizes that the common static 
stress evaluations should be the starting point, not the end point. 
 
8. Challenges Going Forward 
Table 3 in the Appendix summarizes the state of stress testing approaches, emphasizing 
the way the stress-test scenario are constructed, the risk factors and the risk exposures 
considered, and whether these risks are jointly assessed in the outcome indicators of 
interest. Important challenges ahead are integration of the liquidity risk stress test with 
other stress tests as well as the incorporation of feedback loops – the impact of impaired 
assets on subsequent credit and GDP growth.  Bosnia & Herzegovina works on 
developing the blocks of the macroprudential stress test and integration of micro features 
and second-round effects into their stress testing model.  
 
All CSEECBs acknowledge the need for further development of stress-test tools in their 
plans regarding future work. For the Central Banks of Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, and Serbia an important challenge still remains the construction of reliable 
databases. Concerning reporting, Hungary plans to switch to a quarterly implementation 
of the stress-test to improve timeliness of their macroprudential oversight of the banking 
system. 
 
In terms of modeling, the Croatian, Czech, Greek, and Hungarian Central Banks plan to 
further work on the estimation of earnings. Hungary aims to improve the forecast of 
earnings by modeling the NII using a panel regression and build separate models for 
Other Income. Regarding the credit risk analysis, the Czech Central Bank aims to 
construct PD/LGD profiles for individual banks and to incorporate off-balance sheet 
exposures (i.e., committed credit lines). Also, the Czech Central Bank plans to 
concentrate on the challenge of integrating the existing liquidity risk model with the 
stress test for credit and market risk. The Slovak Central Bank plans to align the 
estimation of RWA with other estimations involved in the CAR computation. The 
Central Banks of Austria, Croatia and the Czech Republic aim to develop the feedback 
loop into the real economy for their stress-testing models.   
 
9. Conclusion 
This paper provided an overview of macroprudential stress testing practices of central 
banks in Central and South Eastern Europe including the challenges ahead that the central 
banks face in developing their macroprudential stress-testing methodologies. More 
specifically, the overview focused on the approaches used to construct the baseline and   24
stress macroeconomic scenarios, the scenarios’ mapping to risk factors, computation of 
risk exposures to different risk factors, and estimation of outcome indicators to inform 
macroprudential policy makers. The main challenges going forward for the CSEEBs 
involve: (i) achieving improved data reliability, (ii) better consideration of quantitative 
microprudential indicators in macroprudential stress tests, (iii) the need for explicit 
incorporation of dynamics in stress test to include reaction functions of banks and 
macroprudential policy to changes in main macroprudential indicators, (iv) 
institutionalization of macroprudential policy responses to alarming stress-test results and 
enhanced use of the top-down and bottom-up stress test results in supervisory 
communication with commercial banks, and (v) closer cooperation of macroprudential 
and microprudential supervision and exchange of cross-border information for better 
supervision of international banking groups.        
The reliability of data for stress testing still remains an important problem even for more 
advanced countries. Often, the consistency of various data sources is a challenge. The 
eventuality of adding other financial institutions than banks to the macroprudential stress 
testing exacerbates the data collection issues.
33 At the same time, there is a consensus on 
the need for IT specialists to be present among the on-site supervision staff in order to 
decrease the current overreliance on external audits of IT and information-management 
systems paid for by the banks themselves. The advantages and disadvantages of 
publication of bank-by-bank data is still an open issue for most CSEECBs in general, 
although many of them acknowledge that it could help improve market discipline, 
provided that the data to be published are normalized by supervisors across individual 
banks. This is because the current accounting and regulatory reporting systems leave a 
significant room for maneuver to the benefit of the banks.
 34 
Further, qualitative information from on-site supervision should be incorporated into 
macroprudential stress-testing approaches especially in regards to distinguishing the 
underwriting practices across banks and appropriately calculating the risk exposures for 
individual asset classes. This supports the general call for more on-site supervision and 
understanding of the businesses of the banks.  
The need to carefully consider the dynamics in the stress testing models and the reaction 
functions of the banks (banking sector) and macroprudential policy and the second-round 
effects have been identified. One can draw the parallel to the development process 
concerning models for monetary policy analysis. However, one needs to acknowledge 
that the combination of income and balance sheet effects and significant non-linearities 
makes the stress-testing model development for financial stability oversight a greater 
challenge.  
                                                 
33 Some CSEECBs (i.e, the Czech Central Bank) already include other financial institutions than banks in 
their stress-testing exercises, though the results are presented separately for different financial sector 
segments.  The widening of the scope of the macroprudential stress testing to account for all financial 
entities also raises the challenges of aggregating the risks across financial sector segments.  
34   However, data normalization at the local jurisdiction level does not guarantee an international 
comparison. More enhanced international reporting standards would make the bank-by-bank data 
disclosure more consistent.     25
Regarding macroprudential policy making, CSEEBs report some success in using the 
stress testing tools to convince policy makers to react to financial sector imbalances 
including in the area of monetary policy adjustments. Nevertheless, more efforts in this 
respect are required, including institutionalized policy responses to alarming stress-tests 
results before they materialize. Stress testing should be seen as a continuous 
communication between financial stability staff and banks, including stress testing 
capacity building and meetings of financial stability staff with risk managers of 
commercial banks. Ideally, this communication would take place during regular on-site 
inspections in order to economize the resources of both commercial banks and central 
banks.  
Concerning the institutional arrangements for macroprudential stress testing and its 
impact on macroprudential policy adjustments, the discussions of CSEECBs’ country 
experience in international fora
35  hint that separation of micro and macroprudential 
policy makes the whole system of financial sector supervision more susceptible to 
influence of the financial sector lobby. Further, there is a general institutional problem 
concerning cooperation of all public institutions and respective institutions’ departments 
involved in financial stability oversight, including cross border information sharing and 
cooperation. This includes sharing of confidential information effectively and on a timely 
basis between macroprudential supervision and microprudential supervision and public 
credit registry, and improved cross-border information exchange to effectively capture 
and supervise consolidated risk of banking groups and the associated risk transfers and 
regulatory arbitrage.  
                                                 
35 Some of the most recent discussions among the CSEECBs facilitated by the World Bank took place in 
November 2009 in Prague and May 2010 in Thessaloniki.   26
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Adverse scenario:  
judgmental approach 
Credit risk: aggregated data 
NPLs estimation.  
Market risk: interest rate, 
exchange rate  
Liquidity risk: withdrawal of 
of deposits 
Contagion risk: not 
addressed 
Credit risk:  EAD – the non-
defaulted portfolio 
Market risk: net interest 
income; net open foreign 
currency positions 
Liquidity risk: deposits 
Contagion risk: not addressed 
Credit and Market 
risks(joint impact): CAR 
Liquidity risk: number of 
days the banking system 











Credit risk: PDs estimates  
for ten industries; NPL and 
LLP ratios based on a pooled 
data for CSEE & CIS 
countries 
Market risk: interest rate, 
equity prices, exchange rate  
Liquidity risk: decrease in 
liquid funds, deposits’ drain, 
a disruption in the money 
market.   
Contagion risk: bank failures 
Credit risk: EAD – the non-
defaulted portfolio 
Market risk: net interest 
income, the value of securities’ 
holding; net open foreign 
currency positions 
Liquidity risk: bond and equity 
portfolios, interbank short-term 
funding, and deposits. 
Contagion risk: network model 
– banks’ net values of assets 
and liabilities, credit and 
market risk losses and gains 




Credit and Market risks: 
system-wide credit loss 
distribution 
Liquidity risk: liquidity 
ratios  
Contagion risk : total 
losses in the network 
model 
Static   30
Central Bank  Macro Scenarios  Risk Factors  Risk Exposures  Outcome Indicators  Static/ 
Dynamic 
Central Bank of 
Bosnia& 
Herzegovina 





Credit risk: NPLs from 
aggregate estimation  
Market risk: interest rate 
Liquidity risk: withdrawal of 
various types of deposits  
Contagion risk: not 
addressed 
Credit risk:  EAD – the non-
defaulted portfolio 
Market risk: net interest 
income 
Liquidity risk: deposits (the 
largest deposits) 
Contagion risk: not addressed 
Credit and Market risks 
(joint impact): EL and 
CAR; assumptions for 
income and RWA 
Liquidity risk: number of 
days the banking system 

















regarding the quality 
of loan portfolios. 
In the bottom-up 
stress test, banks 
define their own 
“worst scenario”. 
Credit risk: information 
about PDs from a bottom-up 
stress test; attempt for 
estimations for corporate and 
household PDs. 
Market risk: interest rate 
(bottom-up stress test)  
Liquidity risk: not addressed 
Contagion risk: not 
addressed 
Credit risk:  EAD – the non-
defaulted portfolio 
Market risk: net interest 
income 
Credit and Market risks: 




Baseline and adverse 
scenarios: structural 
macro-model and 
expert judgment.  
 
Credit risk: aggregated data 
NPLs estimation; PDs from 
transition matrixes.  
Market risk: interest rate, 
exchange rate  
Liquidity risk: not addressed  




Credit risk:  EAD – the non-
defaulted portfolio. 
Market risk: net interest 
income, the value of securities’ 
holding; net open foreign 
currency positions 
Credit and Market risks 
(joint impact): EL and 
CAR; model and 
assumptions for 





projections.    31








Credit risk: PDs estimates 
for four loan portfolios; 
estimated LGDs 
Market risk: interest rate, 
exchange rate, equity prices 
Liquidity risk: idiosyncratic 
and market shocks – bank 
run, drawdown of credit 
facilities, uncollectibility of 
some short-term claims, and 
decrease in the value of 
securities 
Contagion risk: banks’ ELs 
from the interbank exposure 
that are high enough to lead 
to a reduction in their CAR 
Credit risk:  EAD – the non-
defaulted portfolio; portfolio 
concentration 
Market risk: net interest 
income, the value of securities’ 
holding; net open foreign 
currency positions 
Liquidity risk: deposits, credit 
lines, short-term claims on 
banks and other clients, 
securities, and assets for sale 
prior maturity 
Contagion risk: banks’ net 
interbank exposures 
Credit and Market risks 
(joint impact): EL and 
CAR; model estimation 
of income, assumption 
for RWA  
Liquidity risk:  bank-
specific liquidity gaps 
Contagion risk: total 












Credit risk: NPL from panel 
estimation  
Market risk: interest rate, 
exchange rate 
Liquidity risk: withdrawal of 
deposits; inability to roll over 
50 percent of wholesale 
funding. 





Credit risk:  EAD – the non-
defaulted portfolio 
Market risk: net interest 
income, the value of securities’ 
holding; net open foreign 
currency positions 
Liquidity risk: deposits; 
wholesale funding 
Credit and Market risks 
(joint impact): EL and 
CAR; assumptions for 
income and RWA 
Static   32




Baseline and adverse 
scenario:  structural 
macro-model  
 
Credit risk: PDs estimates 
for four loan portfolios; 
LGDs estimations  
Market risk: not addressed 
Liquidity risk: joint shocks in 
the  financial markets, 
withdrawal of deposits, and 
in the exchange rate  
Contagion risk: not 
addressed 
Credit risk:  EAD – the non-
defaulted portfolio 
Liquidity risk: interbank assets, 
central bank eligible assets and 
exchange rate swaps; deposits 
and stand-by credits  
Credit: EL and CAR; 
model estimation of 
income, assumption for 
RWA  
Liquidity risk. bank-
specific liquidity gaps 
Static 
Central Bank of 
the Republic of 
Kosovo  
Baseline and adverse 
scenarios: judgmental 
approach 
Credit risk: ad-hoc shock in 
NPL 
Market risk: interest rate, 
exchange rate 
Liquidity risk: withdrawal of 
various types of deposits 
Credit risk:  EAD – the non-
defaulted portfolio;  
portfolio concentration 
Market risk: net interest 
income, the value of securities’ 
holding; net open foreign 
currency positions 
Liquidity risk: deposits (largest 
depositors) 
 
Credit and Market risks: 
EL and CAR; 
assumptions for 
income and RWA 
Static 
National Bank 
of the Republic 
of Macedonia 
Baseline and adverse 
scenarios: judgmental 
approach 
Credit risk: increase in 
classified loans 
 Market risk: interest rate, 
exchange rate 
Liquidity risk: withdrawal of 
deposits 
Contagion risk: not 
addressed 
 
Credit risk:  EAD – the non-
defaulted portfolio 
Market risk: net interest 
income, the value of securities’ 
holding; net open foreign 
currency positions 
Liquidity risk: deposits 
Credit and Market 
risks(joint impact): EL 
and CAR; assumptions 
for income and RWA 
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Central Bank  Macro Scenarios  Risk Factors  Risk Exposures  Outcome Indicators  Static/ 
Dynamic 
Central Bank of 
Montenegro 




with the  IMF 
guidelines 
 
Credit risk: aggregated data 
NPLs estimation. 
Market risk: interest rate, 
exchange rate 
Liquidity risk: withdrawal of 
various types of deposits 
Contagion risk: not 
addressed 
Credit risk:  EAD – the non-
defaulted portfolio; portfolio 
concentration  
Market risk: net interest 
income, the value of securities’ 
holding; net open foreign 
currency positions 
Liquidity risk: deposits (largest 
depositors) 
Credit and Market risks 
(joint impact): EL and 
CAR; assumptions for 








two VAR models –  
one for financial 
market variables and 




Credit risk: LLPs from panel 
estimation  
Market risk: not addressed 
Liquidity risk: not addressed  
Contagion risk: not 
addressed 




Credit risks: EL and 
CAR; assumptions for 










expert judgment  
Credit risk: PDs estimates 
for corporate borrowers and 
LLPs for individual 
corporate debts and 
household debt 
Market risk: interest rate, 
exchange rate 
Liquidity risk: not addressed  
Contagion risk: bank failures 
Credit risk:  EAD – the non-
defaulted portfolio 
Market risk: net interest 
income, the value of securities’ 
holding; net open foreign 
currency positions 
Contagion risk: banks’ net 
interbank exposures 
Credit and Market risks 
(joint impact): EL and 
CAR; assumptions for 
income and RWA 
Static   34








Credit risk: aggregated data 
NPLs estimation. 
Market risk: exchange rate 
Liquidity risk: not addressed  
Contagion risk: not 
addressed 
Credit risk:  EAD – the non-
defaulted portfolio 
Market risk: net open foreign 
currency positions 
Credit and Market risks 
(joint impact): EL and 
CAR; assumptions for 




Baseline and adverse 
scenario: structural 
macro model  
 
Credit risk: PDs estimates 
for corporate loans and 
household loans   
Market risk: interest rate, 
equity prices, exchange rate   
Liquidity risk: not addressed  
Contagion risk: bank failures 
Credit risk:  EAD – the non-
defaulted portfolio; “loans-at-
risk” indicator 
Market risk: net interest 
income, the value of securities’ 
holding; net open foreign 
currency positions 
Contagion risk. banks’ net 
interbank exposures 
Credit and Market risks 
(joint impact): EL and 
CAR; model estimation 











Credit risk: LLPs estimation 
Market risk: interest rate 
Liquidity risk: cessation of 
funding on wholesale market 
and debt securities issuance 
Contagion risk: not 
addressed 
Credit risk: EAD – the non-
defaulted portfolio 
Market risk: net interest 
income 
Liquidity risk: wholesale 
market 
Credit and Market risks: 
CAR 
Liquidity risk: liquidity 
indicators 
Static 
 